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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 991022
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Classification Priority 2

KENNETH NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ACCOMPANYING
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW

Appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of the Fifth Judicial District Court
in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

FLOYD W HOLM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
141 North Main, Suite 220
P.O. Box 2855
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5800
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
160 East 300 South, 6,h Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Utah Court of Aprmate

JUL 2B 2000
Pautette Stejg
Clerk of the Gcart

FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS •
00O00--

SEP 0 1 2000
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 991022-CA
v.
Kenneth Nelson,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon a motion for leave to
withdraw as counsel for appellant, filed by Floyd W. Holm on July
31, 2000, and upon appellant's motion filed August 7, 2000 for
enlargement of time to July 28, 2000 to file appellant's brief.
The Court has refused to rule on appellant's motion for
enlargement of time until appellant's counsel returned the trial
court record to this court. On August 31, 2000, the trial record
was returned.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the brief submitted on July 28,
2000, is accepted for filing. Appellee's brief, if any, shall be
filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Holm's motion for leave to
withdraw is deferred pending plenary consideration of the case.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 18 L.Ed 2d
493 (1967) .
Dated this
FOR THE COURT

u.

day of August, 2 000.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 1, 2000, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
FLOYD W. HOLM
ATTORNEY AT LAW
141 N MAIN STE 220
PO BOX 2 855
CEDAR CITY UT 84721-2855
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
Dated this September 1, 2000.
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S T A T E OF U T A H
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

F1U
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

COURT OP

^PP E A L S

ATTORNEY GENERAL
RYAN MECHAM

RAY HINTZE
CHIEF DEPUTY-CIVIL

„ CHIEF OF STAFF

KIRK TORGENSEN
^

CHIEF DEPUTY-CRIMINAL

18^ January 2001
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. Nelson, Case No. 991022-CA

Dear Ms. Stagg:
The purpose of this letter is to clarify that the State's previous letter, dated 15
December 2000, was filed in lieu of a brief in this case. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d
168, 170 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that if the defendant's brief is in compliance with
requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, and Clayton, the State is not
required to submit a responsive brief).
Sincerely,

/MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

copy: Floyd W. Holm

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 991022
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Classification Priority 2

KENNETH NELSON.
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal in a
criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case by Appellant are as follows:
(a)

Did the lower court properly find that the witness Robyn Iberg was unavailable in
light of the facts and circumstances?
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 991022
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Classification Priority 2

KENNETH NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in that it is an appeal in a
criminal case not involving a first degree or capital felony. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case by Appellant are as follows:
(a)

Did the lower court properly find that the witness Robyn Iberg was unavailable in
light of the facts and circumstances?
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(b)

Did the trial court improperly allow certain hearsay statements of Iberg to be read
at trial, over the objection of defendant, even though defendant had not objected
to such evidence at the preliminary examination?

As to the first issue, the standard of review is whether the lower court abused its
discretion in finding the witness unavailable and determining the efforts of the State in obtaining
the witness at trial were "in good faith". State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982).
As to the second issue, the standard of review is one of correctness; that is, whether the
trial court properly allowed hearsay evidence to be read at trial that was not objected to at the
time of the preliminary examination. State v. Kateso, 684 P.2d 63, 64 (Utah 1984).
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1. Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.
2. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall order,
in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the
ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 (h)(2).
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3. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not effect the substantial rights
of a party shall be disregarded.
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 (a).
4. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is effected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context.
UtahR.Evid. 103(a)(1).
5. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable
means.
Utah R. Evid. 804 (a)(5).
6. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.
Id., Subsection(b)O).
7. Utah R. Evid. 1102 is set forth verbatim in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is a criminal case wherein defendant was charged with theft of a motor vehicle, a
Second Degree Felony, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class C Misdemeanor and
intoxication, a Class C Misdemeanor.
B. Course of the Proceedings.
On June 2, 1999 a preliminary examination was held in which defendant was bound over
on all the aforesaid charges. In district court on arraignment, defendant pled not guilty to said
charges and the matter proceeded to jury trial on September 21, 1999. On the day prior to trial,
the court conducted a hearing as to whether a certain witness, one Robyn Iberg, was unavailable,
therefore allowing her preliminary hearing testimony to be read at trial. The court concluded that
the witness was unavailable and her testimony was read at trial.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty against defendant on all
three counts.1
C. Disposition of the Trial Court.
Based upon the jury verdict and having obtained a presentence investigation and report,
the court entered a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment wherein defendant was sentenced to a

'Although the offense of intoxication was submitted to the jury, during the course of trial
defendant admitted that he had committed that offense.
4

term of imprisonment of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and two 3-month jail
sentences, all to be served concurrently.
D. Statement of Facts.
On or about May 23, 1999, defendant was residing with one Robyn Iberg, who was the
girlfriend of defendant's half brother, who was then incarcerated in the Iron County Jail. On that
same night, an unknown informant reported an accident involving a vehicle owned by Peter
Pikyavit. Pikyavit resided in an apartment near where defendant was residing. The vehicle had
collided with a gas meter and the unidentified informant reported seeing an individual leave the
vehicle and enter the apartment building where defendant resided. Upon being informed of the
accident by law enforcement authorities, Pikyavit stated that the vehicle must have been stolen
and that he was not driving it at the time of the accident. (Transcript of Trial [hereinafter Ti\] 60,
80, 92-93).
Prior to trial the State filed a certain Notice of Hearsay Declarant Unavailability under
Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. On September 20, 1999, this notice was set for an
evidentiary hearing for determination as to whether the hearsay declarant was, in fact,
unavailable. Based upon factual evidence presented by officers who had made numerous
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attempts to locate and serve Iberg with a subpoena, the court found that Robyn Iberg was
unavailable and allowed her preliminary hearing transcript to be read at trial.2
(R. 28-32).
Iberg testified at preliminary hearing (and, therefore, at trial) that on the night in question,
Iberg had gone with another man to a wedding in Beaver, Utah, some 50 miles away. Upon her
return, the defendant was intoxicated and defendant admitted to her that he had stolen a vehicle
and ''needed some money" to leave town. She reported this information to officers investigating
the accident when they arrived at her apartment a second time after the officers had first been led
to another apartment based upon incorrect information from the unknown informant. (Tr. 8184).
In the course of her preliminary hearing testimony Iberg also testified as follows:
Q: Did the police ever come back?
A: In about 15 minutes they came back and they took Kenny outside and then they
asked me what was really going on or they were gonna have me arrested for false
statements so me and my little girl went into the building and stated to them that
he had told us that he had stolen a car and that he was going to Mesquite.
2

Although counsel for defendant requested a transcript of the hearing on September 20,
1999 (See copy of Promise to Pay Cost of Transcript included in Addendum), counsel certifies to
the court that he believes that there was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding of
unavailability and, therefore, a transcript is unnecessary. Nevertheless, if this court determines
that such transcript is necessary to determine counsel's motion to withdraw herein under State v.
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981), then, on behalf of defendant, counsel requests the
court to stay further proceedings on this appeal until such transcript is obtained. (Incidentally, it
was only upon preparing this brief that counsel for defendant first discovered that there was not a
transcript of the September 20, 1999 hearing in the record on appeal.)
6

Q: Okay he was present when he told you that he had stolen a vehicle?
A: Myself. And he also had told his niece, [D. N.], that he had taken a car. But 1
guess he had told her separately; then he had told me.
(R. 96 at 8, 12) (emphasis added).
Although counsel for defendant did not object to the above evidence at preliminary
hearing, he did object to the court allowing such evidence to be read at trial on the grounds that it
was hearsay and without foundation. The court overruled defendant's objection, holding that
since such evidence was not objected to at the preliminary hearing, it was therefore admissible at
trial. (Tr. 74-76, 83, 88).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: Although the state was required to make a "good faith" showing that it had made
appropriate attempts to locate and subpoena Robyn Iberg as a witness, there was substantial
evidence at the hearing on September 20, 1999 to justify the court's decision to determine that
Iberg was unavailable.
POINT II: Although it is arguable that the court should have allowed defendant to object to the
hearsay testimony from Iberg given at preliminary hearing at the time of trial, the lower court was
correct that defendant should have made such objection at the time of preliminary hearing
because it was not ''reliable hearsay" as defined by the Utah Constitution and the Rules of
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Criminal Procedure and Evidence. Moreover, even assuming it was error for the court to
overrule defendant's objection to such testimony at trial, such error was probably harmless in that
it was unlikely it would change the outcome of the trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DETERMINING THAT THE WITNESS WAS UNAVAILABLE
Under State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982), in order to determine that a
witness is unavailable under Rule 804 of the Rules of Evidence, the court must determine that the
efforts of the State in obtaining the attendance of the witness at the trial were "in good faitlf \ In
this case, there was ample evidence to show that officers had made numerous attempts to locate
and to serve Ms. Iberg a subpoena for trial. Based upon the representation of counsel, such
evidence was sufficient to show that Iberg was unavailable to testify at trial and, therefore, her
preliminary hearing testimony could be read at trial. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah
1981).
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POINT II
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF IBERG
ADMITTED AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AS HEARSAY
It should be undisputed that the statements of Ms. Iberg to the effect that defendant
admitted to his niece (Iberg's daughter) that he had stolen a vehicle were hearsay as that is
defined under Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.3 Utah R. Evid. 801 (c).
Defendant argued at trial that such hearsay should not be admitted even though he did not
object through counsel to such testimony at the preliminary hearing. The partial basis for the
court to allow and sustain such objection is that "reliable hearsay" is admissible at preliminary
hearings but may not be at trial. Utah Const. Art. I § 12; Utah R. Crim. P. 7 (h)(2). Arguably,
under Rule 1102 (b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, defendant's statement against interest to
his niece would have been admissible "reliable hearsay" at the preliminary hearing, but not at
trial. Unfortunately, defendant, not his niece, was the "declarant" of such statement against
anothers's (her uncle's) interest and the niece's statement to her mother would not have been
admissible even at preliminary hearing, unless the niece herself were present to testify.
Accordingly, the court may have been correct in not excluding the evidence at trial since it was

'Although such statements by defendant to his niece would not be hearsay as admissions
under Rule 801 (2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, since the statements were offered at trial
through Iberg, not the niece, they constituted hearsay within hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 805. In
other words, although the statements to the niece were not hearsay, the niece's representations to
her mother as to what defendant said were hearsay not within an exception.
9

not objected to at preliminary hearing in that defendant had not properly preserved his objection
under Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
At trial, in objecting to such evidence, counsel for defendant argued that the preliminary
hearing testimony was analogous to a deposition in a civil case and, therefore, even though the
objection was not made at the preliminary hearing, such objection could still be made at trial. Cf.
Utah R. Civ. P. 32 (b) & (c)(3)(A).
Even assuming that the court committed error in not sustaining defendant's objection as
to the hearsay within hearsay statements to defendants niece, it is the opinion of counsel for
defendant that such error was harmless within the contemplation of Rule 30 (a) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Although defendant's statements to his niece were prejudicial, they were
merely cumulative of Iberg's direct testimony that defendant admitted to her that he had stolen
the vehicle. In other words, even without the hearsay statements to the niece, there still remained
the admission to Iberg, which could easily sustain the jury's verdict of guilt. See State v.
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1982).
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND CONCLUSION
Pursuant to State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981), counsel hereby certifies
that he has provided Defendant with a copy of the Brief of Appellant Accompanying Motion for
Leave to Withdraw, along with notice that he may raise additional issues if he chooses, upon
leave of the court. In conclusion, counsel submits the above potential points on appeal and

10

certifies that, based upon the above discussion, he believes them to be wholly frivolous and
without merit and, therefore, requests the court to allow him to withdraw as counsel.
DATED T H I S ^ T d a y of July, 2000.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this ^-o~day of July, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant Accompanying Motion for Leave to Withdraw to the following:
J. Frederic Voros. Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Inmate: Kenneth Nelson #29454
Central Utah Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, UT 84634

FLOYD ^yftOLM
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ADDENDUM

13

SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

])

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

;

vs.
KENNETH NELSON,
Defendant.

;)

Criminal No. 991500527

)i

Judge J. Philip Eves

The Defendant, KENNETH NPiLSON, having been convicted, pursuant to a jury trial, of
THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE, a Second-Degree Felony; I iiAVff\G Tilt
SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT, a Class C Misdemeanor; and INTOXICATION, a Clas» ('
Misdemeanor; said jury trial held on September 21, 1999, in Parowan, Utah, and the Court having
entered said verdicts of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation report, and after said repoil was prepared and presented to the Court, the ( ourt having
called the above-entitled matter on for sentencing on November 1, 1099, in Parow an, I Unh. and the
above-named Defendant, KENNETH NELSON, having appeared before the Couit m pnson together
with his attorney of record Floyd W Holm, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through
Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and the Court having reviewed the presentence m\ estimation

report and having further reviewed the file in detail, and the Court having heard stau nn nis lioin tlu
Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court having ie\ icwrd ihr file in
detail and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters tho follow me ludgnK-iii
Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
H IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Delendani Kl NM 111
NELSON J i a s been convicted of the oftenses of THEFT OF AN OPLRAHLP MO l o p \ I !||('i \
a Second-Degree Felony: LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDKN i, a CIas> ( M i s d u i i c n r .
and INTOXICATION, a Class C Misdcnieanoi; and the Court having asked whefK' tlu D<-!eud<u '
had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, diu\ im MJIIU h n< i a i r ,
to thecontran being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Dcluidani is / m l h ,charged and convicted
SENTENCE
II IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, KLNNETf I NI [ SON, an<i jan u ...t »o i •
coiuictionof THEFT OP ANOPERABI E MOTOR VEHICLE, a SccondT)egiCL I J u i u

,iu_u!

sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison loi a pci iod oi OIK O I , < hliei n ( < -•)
years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the I M.ih Stai

!

) pa'hiKit < i

Collections
II IS FlfR! HER ORDERED that the Defendant, KENNE III Nf:I SON and pursuant In i ,
conviction oi I hAVINO THE SCENE OF AN A C O l D f N I , a ( l a s s ( M i s t k n ^ . r

•K,.M

sentenced to a term oi incarceration in the Iron County Jail foi a pcnod ol ihicc ( ^» munih . and th«
Defendant is hereby placed m the custody of the Iron Counl\ Sheriff
-2-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, KENNETH NELSON, and pursuant to his
conviction of INTOXICATION, a Class C Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of
incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of three (3) months, and the Defendant KS hereby
placed in the custody of the Iron County Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fines shall be imposed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the terms or imprisonment set forth above (1-15 years m
the Utah State Prison, 3 months in the Iron County Jail, and 3 months in the Iron Count) Jud) shall
be served concurrently.
FINALLY, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a term and condition of any parole the
Defendant may receive, he shall pay restitution to the victims in the amount of six hundred nincu
dollars and sixty-two cents ($690.62), said payments to be made through Adult Probation and Far ok
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, KENNETH \ H SON. and
deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accoidance
with the abo\e and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment
DATED this

15~ ^

day of November, 1999.
BY THE COURT

t>t'4r.

J^PHILIP EVES
Hstrict Court Judge

t[

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

}
:ss,
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron < 'ouniy.
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Kenneth Nelson,
Criminal No. 991500527, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, Slate oft Uah,
this

day of November, 1999.

CAROLVN

BULLOCH

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
( SEAL )
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PROMISE i n r n i i M i i i

IN \NSCRIPT

<M v tithtn

Case Name:

WlbOQiill

Trial Court Case No:
Appellate Court Case No.

nm

Estimated Cost of T r a n s c r i p t : / ^ $

I } 0*-)7« ^ 0

A request for a transcript ofTfte proceedingslield in the above refeieiued case on
_ has been made by the undersigned. It is hereb)
/-4
acknowledged that
~(Xod S e p t "2o, \ci^i^)

iftmUx

£

ilH

x

IRON COUNTY

Udflf

Cit>

State of Utah
Court Appointed Public Defenders Office
is obligated to pay the cost of preparing such transcript pursuant to Utah Law, and that
such payment will be made upon completion of the transcript.

Iron Counrv Attorney

PublicZfdfender

Rule 1102. Reliable hearsay in criminal preliminary exam
illations.
(a» Statement of the rule. Reliable haarsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations.
(b) Definition of reliable hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
! !) bearsny evidence admissible at t r i a l undra' i,be ('tab Rules <*T Ivv itii-.i u-^ •.
iLV« hearsay evidence admissible at t r i a l under Rule H0--1 old lie I a ah Rub-"- m"
Wvidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant, a! the p r e l i m i n a r y
. xaminafmn;
• *>> evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity ol :\w\
•xlabit;
I I) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
V' medical and autopsy reports and records;
NJI a statement of a nnn-testidyuig peace officer to a tea!.dying pence ofi'icr;
1 :
. ! a statement made by a child v i c t i m of physical abuse or a sexual offense
winch is p r o m p t l y reported by the1 child victim and recorded m accordance wa 1)
Wide lf).f> old.he U t a h Rules of C r i m i n a l Procedure:
•: S • a stnlemenf of a dec! arant t h a t is w r i t t e n , recorded, or i.runscribi d
\ a eai iia which is:
•.. \) \\\M\("V oath (a- alhrmal mo, o\'
i\\) {pursuant, to a notilicat ion to the declarant t h a t a false statement mane
t herein is punishable;
i
d • oth.er hearsay evidence- w i t h s i m i l a r indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at t r i a l under Rules ${)3 and 80-1 old.he I d ah Rules o f l w i d e n c w
• •• i don/imamee for prodiu-fmn ofo.ddilfon.al ea/r/r/av. [ I hearsay evidence is
rroffered or admitted in the- p r e l i m i n a r y e x a m i n a t i o n , a continuance o f i ! w
t e a r i n g may he granted lor the purpose of f u r t u s h u i g additional evidence if
•; 1 i The magistrate finds t h a t the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted w
nat. adlkaent and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
</! * The defense establishes thai it. would ho so substantially and unfair! v
d -aelvaai aged by the use of i he hearsay evidence as fn outweigh the no ..-r-t•.•-.! •
o'U-.o rleclarant and the efficient a d a u n i s t r a t i o n of justice
' a d d e d effective A p r i l 1, 199'f i

